Policy Owner: CISO
Effective Date: May 8, 2026
Reviewed: Annually
Tested: Annually
Next Review: May 8, 2027
Effective Date: May 8, 2026
Reviewed: Annually
Tested: Annually
Next Review: May 8, 2027
Purpose
This document establishes the plan for managing information-security incidents and events, and offers guidance for employees or incident responders who believe they have discovered, or are responding to, a security incident.Scope
All information-security or data-privacy events or incidents.Definitions
- Security event — an observable occurrence relevant to the confidentiality, availability, integrity, or privacy of company-controlled data, systems, or networks.
- Security incident — a security event that results in loss or damage to confidentiality, availability, integrity, or privacy.
Reporting
If a Neuroscale employee, contractor, user, or customer becomes aware of an information-security event or incident, possible incident, imminent incident, unauthorized access, policy violation, security weakness, or suspicious activity, they immediately report it via:- Email security@neuroscale.ai
- Slack
#security-incidents - For active emergencies: page on-call via our Better Stack on-call schedule
Severity
The Security team monitors incident reports and assigns severity:P2 / P3 — Low and Medium
Suspicions or odd behaviors. Not verified; require further investigation. No clear indicator of tangible risk; no emergency response. Examples: lost/stolen laptop with disk encryption, suspicious emails, outages, strange activity on a laptop.P1 — High
An adversary or active exploitation hasn’t been proven yet but is likely. Examples: lost/stolen laptop without encryption, vulnerabilities with direct exploitation risk, threats with risk of adversarial persistence (backdoors, malware), malicious access of business data (passwords, vulnerability data, payment information).P0 — Critical
Actively exploited risks, or threats that put any individual at risk of physical harm. Identification of active exploitation is required to meet this severity.Escalation
Escalation contacts are listed in Key contacts & on-call.| Severity | Action |
|---|---|
| P0 | Immediate notification to IT and Engineering management (CISO and Engineering Lead). |
| P1 | Open a ticket in our Linear “Security Incidents” project; notify the appropriate manager via Slack with a reference to the ticket. |
| P2 / P3 | Open a ticket and assign to the appropriate department. |
Documentation
All reported security events, incidents, and response activities are documented and adequately protected in our Linear “Security Incidents” project. A root-cause analysis (RCA) is performed on all verified P0 security incidents. The RCA is documented and referenced in the incident ticket and reviewed by the CISO who decide if a post-mortem meeting will be called.Incident response process
For critical issues, the response team follows an iterative process to investigate, contain exploitation, eradicate the threat, recover services, remediate vulnerabilities, and document a post-mortem.Summary
- Event reported.
- Triage and analysis.
- Investigation.
- Containment & neutralization (short-term / triage).
- Recovery & vulnerability remediation.
- Hardening & detection improvements (lessons learned, long-term response).
Detail
- The Incident Manager — typically the CISO or, when the incident is operational, the on-call IRT lead — manages the response effort.
- A central “war room” is designated — physical or virtual (Slack channel).
- A recurring Incident Response Meeting occurs at regular intervals until the incident is resolved.
- Legal and executive staff are informed as required.
Incident response meeting agenda
- Update incident ticket and timelines.
- Document new Indicators of Compromise (IOCs).
- Investigative Q&A.
- Apply emergency mitigations.
- External / breach reporting.
- Plan long-term mitigations.
- Document Root Cause Analysis (RCA).
Special considerations
Internal issues
Issues where the malicious actor is an internal employee, contractor, vendor, or partner require sensitive handling. The incident manager contacts the CEO directly and does not discuss with other employees.Compromised communications
Incident responders must have a communication channel arranged before joining the incident. If there are IT communication risks, an out-of-band channel is chosen and communicated via cell phone.Cloud root / master account compromise
If an AWS root account compromise is known or expected, refer to the AWS Root Account Compromise Playbook. If a Vultr master / root account compromise is known or expected, refer to the Vultr Root Account Compromise Playbook. Both playbooks treat root/master compromise as P0 by default.Ransomware
A confirmed or suspected ransomware event is treated as P0 by default and triggers the following decision points in addition to the standard incident-response process:- Containment-first. Isolate affected hosts and accounts from the network; preserve forensic state where feasible (memory and disk images) before any reimage. The AWS Root and Vultr Root playbooks govern blast-radius containment for cloud accounts.
- No payment without legal review. No ransom payment may be considered, communicated about, or made without (a) written CEO approval, (b) outside-counsel review, and (c) an OFAC sanctions check against the named threat actor and any payment instrument. Most ransomware payments to sanctioned entities are prohibited; the OFAC advisory on facilitating ransomware payments applies.
- Reporting. File reports with FBI IC3 (https://www.ic3.gov) and, where applicable, CISA. Customer notification is governed by the breach-notification timing matrix and contractual commitments.
- Recovery from clean backups. Recovery proceeds from validated clean backups per the Operations Security Policy → Information backup and the Business Continuity & Disaster Recovery Policy; never restore from suspect backups, and rotate all credentials that may have been exposed.
- Communications. External communications are coordinated by the CEO and General Counsel only; internal communications are limited to a need-to-know channel.
- Post-incident. A privileged legal analysis and a separate operational post-mortem are produced per the Privilege and work-product protection section above.
Additional requirements
- Suspected and reported events and incidents are documented.
- Suspected incidents are assessed and classified as either an event or an incident.
- Incident response is performed per this plan and any associated procedures.
- All incidents are formally documented; a documented RCA is performed.
- Incident responders collect, store, and preserve evidence per industry guidance and best practices such as NIST SP 800-86 — Guide to Integrating Forensic Techniques into Incident Response.
- Suspected and confirmed unauthorized-access events are reviewed by the IRT. Breach determinations are made only by the CEO and legal counsel in coordination with executive management.
- Neuroscale promptly notifies customers, partners, users, affected parties, and regulatory agencies of relevant incidents or breaches per Neuroscale policies, contractual commitments, and regulatory requirements, as determined by the CEO and Legal.
- This Incident Response Plan is reviewed and formally tested at least annually. Tests are conducted as facilitated tabletop exercises with the IRT and at least one participant from Legal and one from executive management; the test scenario varies year over year and includes at least one ransomware or data-exfiltration scenario across the rolling three-year cycle. Results, findings, lessons learned, and the dated tabletop after-action report are filed in the SharePoint evidence library used for SOC 2 / ISO 27001 audits.
External communications and breach reporting
Legal and executive staff confer with technical teams in the event of unauthorized access to company or customer systems, networks, or data. Legal and the CEO determine if breach reporting or external communications are required. Breaches are reported to customers, consumers, data subjects, and regulators without undue delay and per all contractual commitments and applicable legislation. No personnel may disclose information regarding incidents or potential breaches to any third party or unauthorized person without the approval of Legal or executive management.Privilege and work-product protection
For any incident with potential legal, regulatory, or contractual exposure, the General Counsel (or outside counsel engaged for that purpose) directs the post-containment investigation, and incident-response work product is generated at the direction of, and to enable legal advice from, counsel. The intent is to qualify the investigation report and counsel-directed forensic analyses for attorney-client privilege and work-product protection under U.S. federal common law and analogous state and foreign doctrines. Operational facts (system logs, runbook output, infrastructure telemetry) generated in the ordinary course of business are not privileged on that basis alone. To preserve privilege:- The General Counsel issues a written engagement memo at the start of any P0 / P1 incident with potential legal exposure, scoping outside-counsel engagement and identifying the privileged investigative workstream. Forensic vendors (incident-response firms, e-discovery providers) are engaged through outside counsel under a Kovel-style engagement letter where appropriate.
- Privileged communications — including counsel-directed RCAs, draft notification analyses, legal-risk assessments, and forensic reports prepared for counsel — are labeled “Privileged & Confidential — Attorney-Client Communication / Attorney Work Product” and stored in the restricted SharePoint legal site. Distribution is on a strict need-to-know basis.
- Operational vs. privileged streams are kept separate. Two report tracks may be produced for the same incident: an operational post-mortem (non-privileged, used for engineering improvement and customer communication) and a privileged legal analysis. The operational track must not contain counsel’s legal conclusions or strategy.
- Slack and chat channels used for the privileged stream are dedicated, access-restricted, and labeled accordingly. Operational war-room channels are separate.
- Lessons from federal and state precedent on incident-investigation privilege — including In re Capital One Consumer Data Security Breach Litig., 2020 WL 2731238 (E.D. Va. May 26, 2020); Wengui v. Clark Hill, PLC, 2021 WL 106417 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 2021); and the broader privilege-and-work-product line of cases — inform this approach: investigations performed in the ordinary course of business rather than for the purpose of obtaining legal advice are not privileged, and operational reports widely distributed within the company are typically discoverable. Neuroscale’s framework is designed to keep the privileged stream focused on legal advice and limited in distribution.
Breach notification timing matrix
Notification timelines vary by regime. The matrix below is indicative; the authoritative deadlines for any given incident are determined by Legal in consultation with outside counsel and the customer contracts in scope. Where a contractual deadline is shorter than the regulatory deadline, the contractual deadline governs.| Regime | Trigger | Notification target | Timing | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| US state breach-notification laws (50 states + DC + US territories) | Unauthorized acquisition of personal information; trigger varies by state | Affected residents; state Attorney General (most states); consumer reporting agencies (some); credit-monitoring offer required by some states | Without unreasonable delay; specific deadlines vary by state from 30–90 days (e.g., Florida 30 days; Maine 30 days; Vermont 45 days; California, Texas, New York “without unreasonable delay”) | State-by-state schedule; see Records-of-Authority maintained by Legal |
| GDPR Article 33 | Personal data breach | Lead supervisory authority | Within 72 hours of awareness; if delayed, reasoned justification required | Regulation (EU) 2016/679 Art. 33 |
| GDPR Article 34 | Personal data breach likely to result in high risk to rights and freedoms | Affected data subjects | Without undue delay | Regulation (EU) 2016/679 Art. 34 |
| CCPA / CPRA | Unauthorized acquisition of personal information of California residents | Affected California residents (with statutory content requirements) | Without unreasonable delay | Cal. Civ. Code §1798.82 |
| NYDFS Part 500 (where a customer subjects Neuroscale to it) | Cybersecurity event reasonably likely to materially harm any material part of normal operations, or required notice to a government regulator | NYDFS Superintendent | Within 72 hours | 23 NYCRR Part 500 §500.17 |
| SEC Form 8-K Item 1.05 | Material cybersecurity incident at a public registrant | SEC (Form 8-K filing) | 4 business days from materiality determination | 17 CFR §229.106 / Item 1.05 of Form 8-K — not currently applicable to Neuroscale; flagged for future if Neuroscale becomes a public registrant |
| SEC Reg S-K Item 106 | Annual cybersecurity-risk-management, strategy, and governance disclosure (and Item 106(c) board oversight) at a public registrant | SEC (Form 10-K and proxy disclosures) | Annually with the Form 10-K | 17 CFR §229.106 — not currently applicable to Neuroscale; flagged for future if Neuroscale becomes a public registrant. Drives the documentation Neuroscale must maintain (board oversight, management’s role, processes for assessing/managing material risks) ahead of an IPO. |
| Customer contractual notification | Confirmed security incident affecting customer data | Customer (per executed MSA / DPA) | Varies; typically 24–72 hours. The customer-notification-window is governed by the executed MSA/DPA. Default if unspecified: 72 hours from confirmation. See the Customer Communications procedure and Customer DPA template. | MSA / DPA |
| EU–US Data Privacy Framework, UK Extension, Swiss–US DPF | Onward transfer breach involving DPF-covered data | DPF participants / data exporters / data subjects as applicable | Without undue delay; per DPF Principles (Notice, Accountability for Onward Transfer) | DPF Principles (successor to Privacy Shield) |
| EU NIS2 Directive (Directive (EU) 2022/2555), where Neuroscale qualifies as an “essential” or “important” entity in any EU member state, or where a customer subjects Neuroscale to it via flow-down | Significant cybersecurity incident as defined by the implementing member-state law | National CSIRT or competent authority of each affected member state | Early warning within 24 hours of awareness; incident notification within 72 hours; final report within one month | Directive (EU) 2022/2555 Art. 23. Currently not expected to apply to Neuroscale; flagged for reassessment on EU establishment, customer flow-down, or service-classification change. |
| PIPEDA (Canada, federal) | Breach of security safeguards involving real risk of significant harm | Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada; affected individuals | As soon as feasible | PIPEDA Division 1.1, §10.1; Breach of Security Safeguards Regulations |
| Other regional laws | Varies | Varies | Varies | Other regional laws (e.g., Brazil LGPD, UK DPA 2018, Australia Privacy Act NDB scheme, Singapore PDPA, etc.) may apply; counsel maintains a current matrix |
Mitigation and remediation
Legal and executive staff determine any immediate or long-term mitigations or remedial actions to take as a result of an incident or breach. Executive staff direct personnel on planning, communicating, and executing those activities.Cooperation with customers, data controllers, and authorities
As needed and determined by Legal and executive staff, Neuroscale cooperates with customers, data controllers, and regulators to fulfill all of its obligations in the event of an incident or breach.Roles & responsibilities
| Role | Responsibility |
|---|---|
| Incident Manager | Primary and ultimate decision-maker during the response period. Ensures the right people from all functions are involved; communicates status updates; resolves incidents in the immediate term; determines and assigns follow-up actions; reports incident details that may trigger breach reporting in writing to the CISO. |
| Incident Response Team (IRT) | Individuals engaged and actively working on the incident. Members remain engaged until the incident is formally resolved or they are dismissed by the Incident Manager. |
| Engineers (Support & Development) | Qualified engineers placed in the on-call rotation; act as Incident Manager (if primary resources unavailable) or IRT member. Responsible for understanding system technology, security controls, logging/monitoring/alerting, communication channels, IR protocols, escalation procedures, and documentation requirements. |
| Users | Employees and contractors of Neuroscale. Responsible for following policies and reporting problems, suspected problems, weaknesses, suspicious activity, and security incidents. |
| Customers | Responsible for reporting problems with their use of Neuroscale services and verifying that reported problems are resolved. |
| Legal counsel | Determines, in conjunction with the CEO and executive management, if an incident presents legal or regulatory exposure and whether it is a reportable breach. Reviews and approves all external breach notices in writing. |
| Executive management | Determines, with the CEO and Legal, if an incident is a reportable breach. Reviews and approves all external breach notices. |
Management commitment
Neuroscale management has approved this policy and commits to providing the resources, tools, and training needed to reasonably respond to identified security events and incidents.Exceptions
Requests for exceptions must be submitted to the CISO for approval. Exceptions are documented.Violations & enforcement
Report violations to the CISO or, where escalation is required, the CEO. Violations may result in suspension of system and network privileges and disciplinary action up to and including termination.Appendices
- Appendix A — Contact information. See Key contacts & on-call.
- Appendix B — Incident collection form. Reports are submitted via the Security Incident intake form, which files into the Security Incidents project in Linear. Post-incident root-cause analysis is captured via the RCA intake form.
- Appendix C — AWS root account compromise playbook. See the AWS Root Account Compromise Playbook.
- Appendix D — Vultr root account compromise playbook. See the Vultr Root Account Compromise Playbook.
Version history
| Version | Date | Description | Author | Approved by |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1.0 | May 8, 2026 | Initial version | Cameron Wolfe | Ishan Jadhwani |